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VOLUME XXXV, No. 4 FEBRUARY 17, 1938

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

POSITIVISTIC AND ACTIVISTIC THEORIES OF CAUSATION

HUME'S account of causation has occasioned a variety of alleged refutations which claim to show that Hume ignored certain obvious features of experience.

In this paper we would show (*a*) that much of the criticism leveled against Hume's argument is purely verbal and (*b*) that two theories of causation other than Hume's, one, viz. Kant's, was not really about causation; and the other which I shall designate "empirical metaphysics" arises from a confusion of syntactical and synthetic sentences.

In the sentence, "*a* caused *b*," "caused" is often taken to be synonymous with such words as "produced," "determined," and so forth, and it is claimed that these words are signs of certain elements deeply rooted in experience.

Where Hume denied any validity to such words metaphysicians either invoke a higher law than the laws of the empirical sciences and repose their concepts in the bosom of a transcendental "something," or else, when the "transcendental begins to weaken under such a burden, they endow the items of experience with whatever metaphysical properties are thought necessary to sustain the productive theory of causation. Where Hume is said to have been too abstract, this new version of empirical metaphysics is said to yield a concrete account of experience.

Hume's conclusion may be summarized thus: "No connection between so-called causes and effects ever is experienced; therefore, there is none. What connection there is is purely subjective. It is a connection between our idea of one object and our idea of another; when we have repeatedly observed that one sort of an object followed a certain other, we have thereby acquired a habit of mind, namely, the propensity which custom produces, to pass from one object to the idea of its usual attendant."[1]

This explanation of causality is said by some critics to involve circularity. Mr. Loewenberg asks, "If custom can produce a pro-

[1] Cf. *Treatise*, Selby-Bigge, p. 165.

pensity, as Hume alleges, why could not one event be described as producing another?"[2]

Hume, it is charged, is explaining causality by a causal process. But, "produce," as Hume uses the word, to describe the acquisition of a habit, is certainly not synonymous with "produce" where one event is said to produce another. "Produce" in the former sense is an explanation of why we use language as we do. Production, in the sense that events are said to produce each other, is a speculation about the nature of the physical world. We can *observe* that people do employ the words "cause" and "effect" under just such circumstances as Hume described; we can never observe one event producing another. The alleged circularity, then, is rooted in the ambiguity of the word "produce."

Professor Whitehead makes a similar criticism. Hume dismissed necessity because he could find no impression for it. But, "Hume seems to have overlooked the difficulty that 'repetition' stands with regard to 'impressions' in exactly the same position as does cause and effect."[3]

In other words, "Where is the impression for repetition?" The question is hardly fair. Suppose I have had, say, seven impressions of "*b*" following upon "*a*." I may count them, but I do not count the counting. Repetition stands merely for the possibility of enumerating the successive recurrences of impressions, "*a*" and "*b*." By observing that two events have recurred always, up to now, in regular sequence, I can form a class of these similar occurrences. But I can not include the fact of recurrence as a member of the class of events that have recurred. Hence, I can not ask for an impression for repetition.[4]

Hume's challenge to exhibit the necessary connection between cause and effect has never been successfully met; and his thesis can not be refuted by mere verbal criticism.[5]

The transcendental metaphysics, especially as exemplified in Kant, offers no basis for refuting Hume. Kant agreed with Hume that there is no perception of necessary connection. Kant simply ignored necessity and changed the causal formula from necessary

[2] "The Elasticity of the Idea of Causality," *The University of California Publications in Philosophy;* Volume 15, p. 19.

[3] *Process and Reality,* p. 204.

[4] Cf. R. W. Church, *Hume's Theory of the Understanding,* pp. 84–85.

[5] It is true that Hume does not always seem consistent in his doctrine of constant conjunction. He admits the possibility of attaining a knowledge of cause and effect from the observation of a single instance of conjunction. See *Treatise,* Selby-Bigge, pp. 104–105. But this possibility does not depend upon our impression of a necessary connection.

connection to irreversible succession. Kant did not answer Hume but rather agreed with him.[6]

Inasmuch as Kant saw the close relation between causation and order he made a valuable contribution to the solution of the causal problem. But when it is once clear how Kant reached his conclusion, it is evident that he was not referring to anything that is meaningful in the sense of being verifiable; causation for Kant is simply the command to judge causally. In the famous "Second Analogy" Kant illustrates his meaning in the familiar example of the ship gliding down stream.[7] Here, he says, the order in which our perceptions of the moving ship succeed each other is objectively determined. But when I look at a house, I can, myself, determine the order in which the perceptions begin, i.e., there is no determinate order specifying at what point I must begin in order to connect the manifold. It would seem that Kant regards any order as objective which is not determined by the will of the subject, and any order which is objective in this sense is also causal. But there is objective succession which is not at the same time a causal order.[8] It is also the case that Kant is not interested in the bare fact of order but rather in showing what order we *must* accept. Since there are no "must" in nature we can not go to nature to confirm Kant's thesis and his argument is therefore futile. Kant's causal theory is as empty as his celebrated Categorical Imperative.

Professor Loewenberg remarks that Kant, as much as did Hume, finds the origin of causality in a human propensity. But, "not wishing to account for this propensity as caused by custom which would reduce it to a natural and contingent event, Kant enshrines it in the bosom of a transcendental self whose existence nothing but postulates and hopes can vouch for."[9]

[6] Positivists, viz., Schlick, see nothing in Kant that threatens their own thesis. Schlick interprets Kant to mean only that causality is a Principle of Order. The objection to Kant arises from the non-empirical source of the order. See "Causality in Everyday-Life and in Science," by Moritz Schlick, *The University of California Publications in Philosophy;* Volume 15, pp. 109–110.

[7] See *Critique of Pure Reason,* N. K. Smith, p. 221.

[8] Schopenhauer, in the *Four Fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,* Bohn, pp. 103–104, remarks, "Just as I am leaving my house, a tile happens to fall from the roof which strikes me; now there is no causal connection whatever between my going out and the falling of the tile; yet the order of their succession—that is that my going out preceded the falling of the tile—is objectively determined in my apprehension, not subjectively by my will, by which that order would otherwise have most likely been inverted."

[9] J. Loewenberg, "The Elasticity of the Idea of Causality," *University of California Publications in Philosophy,* Volume 15, p. 21.

But such is not peculiar to a transcendental metaphysic; all non-empirical theories of causation are equally liable to the same criticism if it can be shown that they are all equally non-sensical. Some philosophers, who do not accept transcendentalism, cling, however, to a belief in metaphysical entities, trusting that these alleged data are somehow observable in the physical world.[10]

In what follows we shall try to show that such words as "production," "necessity," "effectuality," and "intimacy" do not designate any observable features of the physical world.

A sentence is directly verified if it is tested by present perception, e.g., "I now see a red patch on a blue ground." Some sentences are only indirectly verifiable. Professor Carnap illustrates indirect verification in the sentence (P), "This key is made of iron."[11] He shows that the sentence is indirectly verified by direct verification of sentences deduced from (P) together with other already verified sentences. We know that if iron is placed near a magnet it is attracted; a magnet is provided and the key is placed near the bar; as a result we can predict, "the key will now be attracted by the bar." If we say the magnet *causes* the key to move in a certain direction, we can never observe anything but the motion of the key. If a philosopher persists in his assertion that "force" is involved, we can only ask him, "what test can you provide by which we can observe this force?" If no test is forthcoming then we have no means of knowing what the philosopher is talking about. Inasmuch as our philosopher is not speaking about a real object he is not making an assertion but merely utters a series of words.[12]

"The word cause, as used in every day life, implies *nothing but* regularity of sequence, because *nothing else* is used to verify the propositions in which it occurs."[13]

Now, some writers on the causal problem admit the hypothetical character of universal sentences but insist that such singular sentences as, "x now causes y" or "x caused y yesterday" are certain. Loewenberg, for instance, distinguishes causation and causality.[14] Causation, he says, concerns such singular sentences as "the impact of this ball caused that ball to move." But causality involves such sentences as, "x always causes y" and of course such a sentence will never be completely verified. It is Mr. Loewenberg's

[10] Viz., S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity;* Volume I, p. 4. He insists that the non-empirical is experienced and defines philosophy as the "empirical study of the non-empirical."

[11] R. Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, p. 11.

[12] Cf. Carnap, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[13] Schlick, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

[14] J. Loewenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

contention that we must have causation, i.e., a relation between terms *given* in present perception, before we can have causality, or a law which postulates that this given relation will hold between *any* such terms in the future. But it is here contended that we must also have "causality" in Mr. Loewenberg's sense of that word, before we can make any sense of the word "causation."

We are often tempted to believe that the occurrence of an instance of a causal relation is a hard fact, independent of any other observation. But suppose a person were told that a certain medicine caused a patient to recover. Now, suppose this same person asks for some evidence that this medicine really caused the patient's recovery. It would seem that the only possible reply would consist in pointing to past successes with similar patients who took the same kind of medicine.

In other words, it is only because we have "causality" in Mr. Loewenberg's intended meaning of a belief in uniformity, that we can ever defend our faith in a single instance of a causal relation. When we assert (*a*) "*x* caused *y* to-day" it is only because we have made sufficient observations of such *x*'s and *y*'s to lead us to (*b*) "*x* causes *y*." Either causation and causality are one, or, if we make causal judgments, ignoring past uniformity, we may be driven to admit a mere chance connection between the given terms; and chance is the negation of the belief in causal *efficacy*.

We can not conclude, therefore, that there is any basis for distinguishing causation and causality on the ground that the former is existential. What existential import causation has rests on the *terms*, not the relation; causation and causality are words for the same relation and the distinction between them is a mere difference of words.

It is not unusual for philosophers to yield certain points to the positivist doctrine as though yielding some of the usual elements of the productive theory would add strength to the remaining ones. As a further example of such strategy Mr. Dennes argues that we may retain the notion of production as the essence of cause even though we must give up necessary connection.

He writes, "It is a complete mistake to suppose . . . that if we experience force we experience necessitation, and if we do not experience necessitation we do not experience force." [15]

It is granted at once that we do not experience "necessity" as we experience the objects in our spatio-temporal environment. Necessity is a product of definition and can occur only in analytic sentences. In demonstration we can show a theorem to be a neces-

[15] W. R. Dennes, "Causation as Continuity and Production," *The University of California Publications in Philosophy*, Volume 15, p. 161.

sary consequence of certain axioms and certain transformative rules. But "force" as intended in the above quotation either is or is not an aspect of the physical world and is a candidate for verification. Nothing is gained for "force" by admitting that "necessity" is a syntactical term.[16] The whole point is, how do we *experience* force? Certainly the advocates of such a doctrine refer to more than the force of demonstration—to more than mere language. But Mr. Dennes, nevertheless, proceeds to the search for force and finds it in our capacity to vary language. In other words, in the long passage from primitive animism to the present modern views of causation a certain *effort* has been required in changing the causal *formula*. But it was my impression that the "activists" decried the whole syntactical theory of philosophy and sought instead, an ontological basis for production.

A further instance of the purely verbal account of the production theory of causation is to be found in the doctrine of substance.[17] Causation then becomes the inward process of substance. Broad, for instance, identifies substance with particularity. He seems to mean that in the sentence, "this is red and triangular," that what is being talked about is not merely redness and triangularity but also particularity. To say, "this is particular" is no more meaningful than to say "this is a thing." When we say, "the table is a thing" we are not uttering a synthetic sentence. No act is required to verify the sentence, as it would be were we to say, "the table is red." The sentence, therefore, "this is a substance," is analytic and says nothing about the world. Professor Carnap has shown how all sentences such as, "The rose is a thing" are correctly rendered; "The word 'rose' is a thing-word." All such sentences are syntactical sentences, i.e., concern only linguistic forms.[18]

But these philosophers, having dragged in substance in order to explain causation, decide that after all it is not the direct causal factor—events are causes.

Broad, for instance, prefers to say that the cause is an event happening *in* a certain substance. The effect is an event happening *to* a certain substance, as when the motion *in* the stone does something *to* the windowpane.[19]

Though causes are events, it is never possible to isolate events. The arbitrary selection of any single event as cause, while satisfying practical purposes, is not acceptable to the procedure of science.

[16] It is, of course, a mistake to even look for an impression of necessity as Hume did.

[17] See S. Alexander, *op cit.*, Volume I, p. 269. W. E. Johnson, *Logic*, Volume III, p. xviii. C. D. Broad, *Perception, Physics and Reality*, pp. 95–104.

[18] See *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, pp. 58–64.

[19] *Op. cit.*, pp. 75–77.

Schlick shows how such a commonplace event as dropping one's pencil involves innumerable facts which range all the way from the motions of the molecules of the fingers to the position of the moon; we could never know its complete cause.[20]

Because the scientist must consider the measurement of quantities rather than the description of occurrences, he speaks, not of two events, cause and effect, but rather of a functional relation between measurable quantities. We can not conveniently drop the word "event" as it appears in our coarser everyday language. But the events that interest the scientist are finer and so close together that he can do little more than refer to a whole series of events. If he wants to convey his meaning in popular language, he may resort to the cruder expressions that the layman must depend upon. In such a case, he may designate a series of events, "the cause of," thereby suggesting that the cause is a single event. But all the scientist ever finds is more and more events.

Metaphysicians, not satisfied with this analysis, would try to find some sort of entity along which events are strung, much as beads are connected on a string. They then endow the string with some magical force that keeps the events dynamic and intimate one with the other. If the positivist insists that only events are found in the world, then he is likely to be told that, if by definition there is nothing in the world but events, then it is useless to look for anything else. But it is not by definition that the world consists of events, such is the delivery of tested experience.

The scientist is not dealing with purely syntactical sentences as is the logician, nor is he toying with the pseudo-object sentences of metaphysics. He is concerned with real-object sentences and such sentences are not yielded by mere definition. It is more nearly true to turn the tables and show wherein the productive theory of causation is a mere product of linguistic invention—using words where no things are found.

It is the privilege of the "muddle-headed" tradition to cry out against the "simple-minded." They argue that we must understand the whole, the system, the cosmos—"believing where we cannot prove." Mr. Mackay, arguing in this vein, pleads that isolated events are not intelligible and must be explained only in an appropriate context.[21] The historian, for example, must catch the spirit of the age, if he would interpret cause and effect in history. But it is difficult to see how the spirit of the age is much more than what the historian reads into it. As Spinoza observed, what Peter

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 111.

[21] D. S. Mackey, "Causality and Effectuality." *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, Volume 15, pp. 141–142.

thinks of Paul reveals more about Peter than it does of Paul. Historians of the Marxist Tradition, the Agrarian, or the Genteel Tradition, can use the identical events of the American Civil War and come out with three histories of that conflict. Though it is true that the difficulty in employing causal explanations in history is due to the impossibility of isolating events, this impossibility exists not because events are imprisoned in a context, but rather because the events are so close together that we must take a whole string of events at once, and even then we don't know where to begin.[22]

The whole point at issue between the positivist and productive theories of causation appears to reduce to a single question: "Can the empiricist begin his work without first constructing some theory of the cosmos?" The most plausible answer demands another question: "Can such words as 'absolute,' 'reality,' etc., function as the subject of real-object sentences?" When the scientist asserts the reality of something he is saying that the object concerned can be found at some definite time and place. He refers his object to the physical world and his assertion is therefore verifiable and meaningful. But a sentence such as "Reality is dynamic" is meaningless because we are not told how to verify it.[23]

But suppose that instead of sentences like "the Universe is dynamic" we take sentences that involve real-objects, such as concern the scientist. Now, can we predicate "force" of such objects?

If I say, "a is active in relation to b," can I deduce anything from the statement about future perceptions? If it has been observed on a number of occasions that b follows a with unfailing regularity, then I can predict similar phenomena. But whatever is said about a's enforcing b or producing b is entirely devoid of any predictive value.

Successful prediction is the single criterion for judging a causal relation. The only basis we have for such prediction is our observation of the regularity of succession. But there is no answer to the question, "How many times must we make the observation?" It is impossible to formulate any rule; seven times or seventy times seven would be far from safe; we simply grow in faith as the number of observations increases. We never observe determination between events, but as Schlick observes, a definite sense can be given "determination" within the positivist theory.[24] Determination means the ability to *calculate* the effect *if* the cause is known. But,

[22] Cf. Charles A. Beard, "The Devil Theory of History and War," *New Republic*, March 4, 1936. Also, John Sommerville, "Logical Empiricism and the Problem of Causality in Social Science," *Erkenntnis*, Bd. 6, H. 5/6.

[23] Cf. Carnap, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 113.

of course, we can never know that the laws which constitute the basis for our prediction are absolutely valid.

Where determination is given the sense of calculation the distinction between causation and teleology disappears. We can not now say that causation is always *a tergo,* whereas in purposeful activity the cause is in the future. For by this interpretation causation becomes symmetrical; causes may be calculated from their effects as well as effects from causes and the future may be said to determine the past as well as the past determines the future.[25]

The productive theory of causation seems to rest upon a confusion between science and art. The artist expresses what he feels; perhaps he can arouse a similar feeling in his audience. But having "felt" the emotive meaning that the artist intends, there is naught to do "but consider and bow the head."

The scientist, on the other hand, speaks in a language which allows confirmation and he may provide a method whereby we can test his sentences.

It would be non-sense to make any value judgments on the relative merit of art and science. Truth is not beauty; the two can not even be compared. But the philosopher, undecided whether to be poet or scientist, too frequently employs the language of poetry in discussing the nature of the physical world. He thereby endows nature with his own feelings and keeps alive the anthropomorphic tendency that he ascribes to primitive man.

BRUCE WATERS.

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A NOTE ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEIDEGGER

TEN years ago Martin Heidegger presented to the world, in the first volume of *Sein und Zeit,*[1] his introduction to a novel type of metaphysics. His work was said to constitute a uniquely effective wedge into the ontological problem; with its approach through an "existential" analysis of human nature, it purported to set philosophy at last upon the highroad to the fastnesses of being—with a key to their most secret chambers in her hand. On the face of it, Heidegger's method seems to consist in the familiar handling of metaphysical problems through a prior analysis of human nature. He begins, it is true, not with the epistemological question, what can I know, but with a more inclusive problem, very inaccessible to

[25] See, Schlick, *op. cit.,* pp. 115–116.

[1] Heidegger, Martin. *Sein und Zeit,* erste Hälfte. Third edition. Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1931. (Reprint from *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung,* Volume VIII.)

simple statement. Perhaps it is the summation of Kant's three questions: what is man—or, more aptly, *how* is man, what is his *modus essendi?* Still, that is but another variation of the approach to nature through human nature; and even though every familiar term—man, person, human being, human nature, experience—is denied us as inadequate, it would certainly appear to the uninitiate that some such analysis is the theme of *Sein und Zeit.* To its author, however, and to the sympathetic audience that greeted the appearance of his work, no such superficial interpretation is in any way permissible or relevant. Heidegger's method, and especially the philosophical earnestness fundamental to its application, achieved for the philosophical public of Germany a new Copernican revolution in speculative thought.

If one takes that judgment seriously, one should expect, therefore, that a more considered study might reveal, within the framework of an anthropocentric approach to metaphysics, some unique insight or some new tool of philosophical analysis. As a matter of fact, I can not make any such discovery either in Heidegger's published works or in oral expositions of his views.[2] A close examination seems rather to expose, within the ponderous sentences of essay and lecture, a very insubstantial basis for a flimsy superstructure. Heidegger's philosophy is unique only in its rampant misuse of language and in its own emphatic claim to uniqueness. I should like to support that thesis by a brief analysis of its method and content.

1. There are two essential preliminaries to the application of Heidegger's method. The first of these is a return to original insights through the "destruction" of traditional philosophies. One might speak of primitivism in this connection, were not the term "primitive" in some of its connotations so emphatically eliminated by Heidegger's own exposition of the process denoted. The intuitions to which he wishes to return are, indeed, temporally primitive; they are primitive, likewise, in the sense that they are said to be the original, uncorrupted, and therefore peculiarly immediate insights of man into metaphysical reality. But they are not to be regarded as primitive in the sense of being simple, naïve, less self-conscious or less sophisticate than later speculations. Such notions Heidegger denounces roundly; and with them he would certainly reject the title of primitivist. He wishes to return, not to first faltering foot-

[2] Texts for this criticism are: *Sein und Zeit; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik,* Bonn, F. Cohen, 1929; *Was ist Metaphysik,* Bonn, F. Cohen, 1929; *Vom Wesen des Grundes,* Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1931; notes on lectures by Heidegger at the University of Freiburg: *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,* winter semester 1931–1932; *Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie,* summer semester 1932; notes on discussions, seminar on Plato's *Phaedrus,* summer semester 1932.

steps, but to hard-won heights long neglected by wanderers on the level plain of professional philosophy. He wants to plumb forgotten depths, not to wade in obscure shallows. It is, to be sure, characteristic of Heidegger not only here but throughout his system, to reject in vehement terms all "isms" that might possibly be applied to his thought; so that one may perhaps call him a primitivist in his historical approach, with the reservation that he shuns that or any title. Whatever one calls the method, however, it is clear that Heidegger is attempting to effect a return to some first insight uniquely profound and difficult of attainment. He effects that return, in part, by a "destructive" analysis of philosophic tradition. I may cite a few illustrations of the "destructive" method, without going too far into the impassable jungles of Heideggerian vocabulary.

In his lectures on truth,[3] Heidegger subjected the long-suffering correspondence theory to scathing criticism—not because of its logical inconsistencies or factual inadequacies, but because it had falsified the early Greek intuition—an intuition lost in part as early as the *Theaetetus*. Starting out with an exposition of Aquinas's definition of truth, he pronounced its central error to lie in the fixing of judgment as the locus for truth. Truth is a property of being, not of judgment. Truth can not rightly be said to reside in judgments, since judgments, as one kind of being, already reside "in truth"—and also, as we shall see, in untruth. To attain this relocation, Heidegger turns to a literal interpretation of the Greek ἀλήθεια. Truth is unhiddenness: the unhiddenness of being. Being discovers itself. "Unhiddenness," however, suggests not only the being unhidden, but the coming out of hiding. If it is un-hidden, being must have been or must be in some manner hidden. The hiddenness of being, or untruth, is likewise a factor in the medium of all existences. Perhaps this is but a topsy-turvy way of saying that knowledge involves the possibility of error, or that empirical judgments are probable only, or the like. It very emphatically asserts itself, however, to be no such thing—but rather a re-achievement of a primary intuition historically antecedent to the establishment of anything like an epistemology. An exposition of the *Republic* and the *Theaetetus*, where the genuine (being) notion of truth and the degenerate (judgment) concept are said to appear in hybrid form, is used to substantiate this interpretation.

For the original intuition of being itself, secondly, it is necessary to go farther back than Plato—to the Presocratics. Heidegger's interpretation of Anaximander illustrates admirably his historical method. Let me sketch, quoting from lecture notes, the procedure

[3] Winter semester, 1931–1932.

followed in the lectures of the summer semester 1932, entitled "The Beginning of Occidental Philosophy."[4]

The introductory lecture began with this statement:

> Occidental philosophy began among the Greeks in the sixth century before Christ. It has been falsified by Rome, Judaism, and Christianity. We shall seek out the unfalsified beginning. We therefore examine the first extant fragment, namely, two sentences of Anaximander.

The longer fragment[5] is then analysed phrase by phrase, with ample philosophical and philological detail. I shall quote a portion of the exposition of the first clause: "ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι – –." The question is: of what is Anaximander speaking? "He is speaking," Heidegger answers, "of τὰ ὄντα."

> τὰ ὄντα means that which is [*das Seiende*]. It is being considered as a unit —as appears from the fact that the neuter plural in Greek governs the singular verb.
>
> What, then, do we mean by "that which is"? What does Anaximander mean by it?
>
> We could mean some such thing as the sea, the land, the sky, plants, animals, people, man-made things, human history. All those things are something [*Seiendes*]; they are particular existents [*vereinzelte Seienden*]. But here it is τὰ ὄντα that is spoken of, *that* which is [das *Seiende*]. So it is not particulars that are indicated, but somehow everything together.
>
> Does Anaximander then perhaps mean the whole count of particular things, their total sum? Can one know all things, can one count up every single one? No. τὰ ὄντα can not be used in this sense either.
>
> Let us begin again. Let us try to count up particular things. What kind of undertaking is this? We withdraw the individual from its environment; but *before* we begin to count we have in each individual *more* than an individual. This more is not all (in the sense of a sum), and yet it is more than all.

There follows an exposition of the whole as more than the all (or sum total), and it is concluded that being considered as a *whole* likewise fails as the denotation of τὰ ὄντα.

> That which is thus eludes us when we want to lay hands on it. It is neither particular things, nor the sum total of its existents, nor the whole of being. What is it then?
>
> We say "being as a whole," and distinguish the meaning of that phrase from our meaning when we say "the whole of being." What do we mean by being as a whole [das *Seiende im Ganzen*]?
>
> Being as a whole is what we have continually before us and around us. It does not matter how much of this being we *know*, i.e., whether or not we have scientific knowledge of it. The peasant has being as a whole immediately before him, while the city man with his fluttering multiplicity of things does not have it in the same immediate proximity. Being as a whole always has completeness in some degree; everything about us is interlocked with everything else. All things have a character of belonging together. This wholeness is familiar to us, so that something new, in making its appearance, appears out of a familiar background.

[4] Summer semester, 1932.

[5] Diels frag. 1.

The next question is: what is said about this "being-as-a-whole"? Similar questions, with similarly detailed answers, work through the whole sentence.

Especially crucial is the retranslation of δίκη, ἀδικία, and τίσις, in which Heidegger stresses the foreignness to the Greek mind of moral terms like justice, injustice, retaliation. Presocratic philosophies are not "nature" philosophies, in which "moral" analogies can be drawn. The separation of being into "natural" and "moral" spheres is a later and degenerate phenomenon. The new amoral translations, to be sure, are most difficult to grasp—not because the original is "naïve," primitive, hesitant—but because "we do not see the greatness of the beginning since we have grown small." "Only what is itself great or concerned with greatness can come into contact with greatness." From this proposition it is easy to infer that, small as we are, we need some gradual initiation into the beginning and its problem; and so we are introduced to Heidegger's interpretation of that problem itself (*die Seinsfrage*), and to the core of his own philosophy.

The occult and exalted nature of the "*Seinsfrage*" forms a central strand in Heidegger's thought; and such is the arrogance with which its lofty position is proclaimed, that one wonders whether there are not ulterior motives involved. It seems sometimes to be for the greater glory of Heidegger that all thinkers of the past twenty-five hundred years are found to have been so tragically off the track. Heidegger's procedure seems to be especially dubious, for example, in that part of *Sein und Zeit* in which he rejects, with his usual emphasis, the Hegelian definition of time in its relation to spirit.[6] By snatching Hegel's words out of their context, his critic creates the impression that *Geist* and *Zeit* have been artificially drawn together in a vacuum, and then identified,—as if, to use Alexander's figure, a relation had descended upon them like the cover on sleepers in a common lodging-house. Such an artificial relationship is then shown to falsify the actual situation; and a new description of the relation between time and personal existence is set down—a description which is strongly reminiscent of the original Hegelian text, so rudely dismembered for purposes of criticism. Heidegger's primitivism, together with his "destructive" analysis of later concepts, appears sometimes to be a function of his determination to be philosophically indebted to no man.

2. Besides clearing the road of the encumbrances of traditional theories, it is essential, secondly, to forestall any interventions that might arise from science, logic, or common sense.

Two objections are made to the point of view of the scientist or

[6] *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 428 ff.

scientific philosopher. The categories he uses are barren and distorted; and the objectivity he boasts is illusory. The category of "nature," as the interpretation of the Presocratics suggested, is an artificial and second-hand concept, introduced at a point in history at which the profound insight of the true philosopher gives way to the verbal stereotypes of the academician. It is being as a whole, not nature or morality or God or some such arbitrarily hacked-off segment of being, that is the object of genuine philosophic reflection. Such terms must be abandoned altogether from the vocabulary; they are not even permitted, in Hegelian fashion, en route to a final synthesis. Especially vicious is the conceptual corollary of "nature," "*Vorhandenheit.*" *Vorhandenheit*[7] seems to mean the passive thereness of extended objects. Perhaps "simple location" best renders the term; but such is the insularity of Heidegger's thought that he steps forward as the sole exponent of that concept or the "fallacy" involved in its usage. Nor does he consider the possibility that science itself may have outgrown the simple spatio-temporal categorizations of the seventeenth century; the science he criticizes is still thoroughly Newtonian. Taking something like a Newtonian world-view then, as his object, he speaks of it as distorting and falsifying, by its oversimplifications, the true nature of being. Being is not primarily out there, passive, mechanical; it is here-at-hand, ready for use, organically related in a living whole. Such criticism is, of course, reminiscent of Bergson; and Heidegger does actually acknowledge a certain kinship with the French intuitionist, stressing, however, the inadequacy of Bergson's analyses.[8]

If one ask why the scientist wastes his time in the futile manipulations of falsifying concepts, Heidegger answers that the key to the scientific attitude may be found in the illusory purpose of "objectivity" which the scientist sets up as his goal. The mere fact that perspectives enter into the cognitive and perceptive processes seems to Heidegger to cancel the possibility of objective thought. Objectivity, we are told, means "point-of-viewlessness"—unmediated approach to bare fact, totally independent of the knower's perspective. It is evident, however, not only that there is no bare fact; but that if there were any, no "point-of-viewless" approach to it would be possible. "There is no point-of viewlessness," Heidegger declares, "there is only choice of point of view, strength of point of view, and courage of point of view."[9] Objectivity, since it is, on Heidegger's definition, equivalent to point-of-viewlessness, is thus rendered illusory; and science or scientific method, whose essence

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 59, 61, 81, etc.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 433, n.; p. 333.

[9] Summer semester, 1932.

is to seek just such objectivity, is set aside as philosophically impotent.

Any claim for logic as a tool of philosophical analysis is likewise refuted by an argument similar to the above. The categories of logic are as dead as those of natural science. That fact is especially useful in the course of Heidegger's own arguments. Should the logician venture to point out a fallacy, or suggest that logic can not follow the philosopher's line of inference, "so much the worse for logic." [10] The logic-chopping faculty can not be expected to find its way into the labyrinth of being.

Common sense, finally, is likewise silenced by its own inability to follow the workings of the philosophic mind. Heidegger uses to its extreme the principle of philosophical aristocracy. Philosophy is the task of the few, of the great, the genuinely human in a normative sense. The analogy of the cave is grist to this mill.[11] That apparently solid, close-to-earth faculty that we name common sense, is in fact the communicant of shadows. It is only the brave philosopher—for dullards, madly brave—who dares the steep ascent and the bright glare of the sun; it is only he who comes to know the sunlight and its workings, and to recognize in their true character the shadowy figures of the cave. To deny all this is to render oneself suspect of being among the captives, a knower of shadows only. Thus any protests from the side of common sense, like those from logic, refute themselves by virtue of their own inadequacy.

It should be added, perhaps, that the forcefulness of Heidegger's "aristocratic" arguments depends in large part on the personality of the lecturer. One is caught as in a political rally by the slow intensity of his speech. The contemptuous epigrams with which he dismisses the protests of logic or good sense sting the listener's ears with their acidity; and his prophetic solemnity when he invokes the quest for being ties one as spellbound as if one were a novice taking his first step into the rituals of the Eleusinian mysteries. One sits on the edge of one's chair and agrees breathlessly—no point-of-viewlessness, only courage of point of view—and oh, were one but among the blessed few who have it!

3. With the path cleared of all objections from logic, science, or common sense, a start may be made in the analysis of personal existence through which the new ontology is to be approached. The method is a phenomenological one. Here again, however, the title must be applied with reservations. Heidegger was nurtured in the school of the phenomenologist, Husserl, and as late as *Sein und Zeit* he acknowledges his indebtedness to the master, and the importance

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Winter semester, 1931–1932.

of the phenomenological attitude for his own explorations.[12] He has since, however, disclaimed that relationship, and has been as acid in his critique of phenomenology qua school or system as in any other historical judgment.

His method, notwithstanding, is at the outset akin to that preached by his teacher. The purpose, in fact, of the rigorous discarding of traditional or professional phraseologies is to come to a face-to-face view of the phenomenon itself. The game, one might say, is to outstare the phenomenon, dubbing it with no familiar titles, but waiting until in the moment of divine madness a new one occurs. The phenomenon is in this case any everyday happening. Heidegger stands for twenty minutes at the casement window in the seminar room,[13] asking: what am I doing when I turn this handle? Would a dog eating a bone be doing the same kind of thing? What is the essence of my action? What is the difference between man-opening-window and dog-eating-bone? What am I doing when I walk down the street? What is the relation of my foot to the sidewalk? I don't actually touch it, and yet I feel it. How is this possible?

There is something in all this very like the temper of Bradley's analysis of relations, even though the outcome be rather different. Immerse yourself in the phenomenon until it becomes practically impossible to extricate yourself sufficiently to analyse it in any sane perspective. Then, instead of escaping to the Absolute, subject the phenomenon to a novel terminology: make it connote the essence of being as temporality, or the inner nature of some occult type of relatedness.

4. There follows upon the first baptism of the phenomenon the tortuous series of impenetrably involved definitions that is most distinctive of Heidegger. Professor Carnap has pointed out that Heidegger's arguments in *Was ist Metaphysik* depend to a large extent upon syntactical misconstructions.[14] The phrase, "nothing nothings," for instance, is a meaningless analogy to such a sentence as "rain rains." The same holds of the similar proposition, "world worlds."[15] Nouns as well as verbs, moreover, are invented—or at least receive startlingly new denotations in the course of Heidegger's reasonings.

In contrast to the natural or common-sense category of *Vorhandenheit,* for instance, the notion of *Zuhandenheit* is introduced to suggest the *modus essendi* of things within the world of the personal

[12] *Sein und Zeit,* pp. 27 ff.

[13] *Phaedrus* seminar, summer semester, 1932.

[14] Carnap, Rudolf. "Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache." *Erkenntnis,* Volume II, pp. 219 ff. Cf. esp. section 5, pp. 239 ff.

[15] Summer semester, 1932. *Vom Wesen des Grundes,* p. 101.

existent.[16] Things are not primarily out there, lying passively in a neutral space from moment to moment. They are at hand, there to be used, grasped, worn, eaten, played with, admired, or shunned. They threaten, beckon, elude, offer themselves for use or for neglect. A hammer is primarily a tool, something to pick up and hammer with—not just a thing of such a shape and size and hardness. A tree is first of all something that offers shade from the noonday sun or shelter from the rain—not a straight stick with arms that sprout green. Things exist fundamentally in the mode of at-handness, not of simple thereness. They appear to us basically in terms of their function in our world. It is only by abstraction—and falsification—that we transform them into pieces of stuff, there in themselves and only posteriorly approached for our uses.

We, moreover, in our world—immersed in the being-as-a-whole known to Anaximander—are said to have "existence" in a very special sense. Just that special kind of self-conscious (the term is forbidden, but its denotation is at least similar to that intended here) relation to our environment and history which characterizes our experience (a term also forbidden) is called "Existence."[17] The distracted losing of one's selfhood in the petty cares of every day is "a special mode of existence" called "insistence"[18] or, in *Sein und Zeit*, "*Verfallen.*"[19] The self-anticipatory character of personal existence, finally, is its "transcendence."[20] In the development of these concepts, moreover, we find a host of new terms like "*Auffälligkeit, Aufdringlichkeit, Aufsässigkeit,*"[21] "*Weltlichkeit, Umweltlichkeit, innerweltlich,*"[22] "*Bewandtnis, Bedeutsamkeit,*"[23] etc. etc. On the first analysis of existence there follows a recapitulation in terms of temporal concepts—terms that bear no relation to any notion of time as an ordered series, but are said to introduce a new and more fundamental concept of temporality, of which the "vulgar" concept is the every-day or *verfallen* offshot.[24] *Innerzeitigkeit,*[25] *Gegenwärtigung, Gewesenheit, Geschichtlichkeit,* and *Geschichte* as opposed to history[26] are among the terms that meet us at this juncture. In short, a page of *Sein und Zeit* on which novel definitions are under-

[16] *Sein und Zeit*, p. 69.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 42, 53, 117.

[18] Summer semester, 1932.

[19] *Sein und Zeit*, p. 175. Summer semester, 1932.

[20] *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 363 ff. *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, p. 79. Summer semester, 1932.

[21] *Sein und Zeit*, p. 74.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 65, 66.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 87.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 420 ff.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 412.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 359, 365, 375.

lined is likely to be very completely covered with pencil marks. Let me quote one typical sentence, the like of which occurs on every page of the treatise:

> Das Gewärtigen des Wobei in eins mit dem Behalten des Womit der Bewandtnis ermöglicht in seiner ekstatischen Einheit das spezifisch hantierende Gegenwärtigen des Zeugs.[27]

Perhaps the climax of the whole occurs in a central portion of *Sein und Zeit* in the definition of *Dasein* (personal existence) as *Sorge* (care). Existence, it turns out, is essentially care; and care is: *Das Sich-Vorweg-Schon-Sein-In (der Welt) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich-begegnendem Seienden)*.[28] Paraphrased, this gnarled definiens states the platitude that human nature participates through anticipation in the future and through memory in the past; and at the same time is bound by indissoluble ties to the insistent cares of the present.

5. It is not, however, solely linguistic *tours de force* that make up the content of the new ontology and its propaedeutic. There is in almost every philosophic system some little truth of psychology or epistemology that makes the thing seem plausible up to a certain point. And here there is, sometimes taken over bodily from Kierkegaard, sometimes originally phrased, description of certain states of mind common to the experience of many individuals. Central, for instance, to *Sein und Zeit* as well as to the little treatise, *Was ist Metaphysik*, is the "concept" of "dread."[29] Every one, I suppose, knows in some variation the nauseous feeling of a vague undefined dread—whether as fear of death, or simply as an undenotative anxiety toward nothing in particular. The feeling of being on the verge of nothingness is certainly a bona-fide psychological datum in most experiences. And as older rationalistic idealisms converted the exhilaration of intellectual enjoyment, the thrill of understanding a mathematical principle or of intuiting the scope of a philosophical generalization, into a cosmic sensation, reading Reason into the structure of the Really Real, so the venerable idealistic arrogance reasserts itself here, taking a more avowedly emotional phenomenon as the center of a new solution of the *Seinsfrage*. From dread we pass to "being to death,"[30] which takes the stage as the central factor in existence, the genuine meaning of "care"; and being to death in turn leads us to those mystic temporal categories cut off from the understanding of the vulgar concept of time. From this new and higher temporality, finally, we are ready to move on in our search for

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 353.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 192.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 184 ff.
[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 235 ff.

being—we shall find it within the horizon of an existential notion of time.

The categories of transcendence, insistence, and genuine historicity—boundness to one's past—likewise reflect familiar aspects of human nature. Planning ahead, worry about petty details of the day's routine, dependence on one's youthful conditionings for attitudes and opinions: those are obvious features of our experience, good solid starting points in matter of fact. If the beginning is so plausible, should we not give ear to the amplifications that follow—should we not climb with the philosopher from such solid stepping-stones to what should be equally solid heights of speculation? And so we find ourselves plunged suddenly into the being of being with its tangle of neologisms—and yet the exact spot at which we passed from sense to nonsense is hard to mark. Once we begin, it seems we are bound to follow.

Heidegger's new variation on the idealistic theme—his playing up of my emotional experience (dread, *Verfallen*, etc.) as the key to the center of Being, purports, of course, to have left far behind it the old strife of realism-idealism. But it exhibits in fact the temper of dogmatic philosophy in its worst form, taking as its basis a certain experience, say, of psychological dizziness, and embroidering on that field the pattern of a new ontology. And the psychological existence of the field, the joy of recognition with which we greet the description of a phenomenon from our own experience, helps to render plausible the subsequent plunge into profundity.

Besides its basis in the data of introspection, moreover, the new ontology includes some half-truths of epistemology, anthropology, etc., which likewise serve to render it palatable at first taste. The first portion of *Sein und Zeit* contains, for example, an interpretation of knowing as subordinate to doing which is strikingly reminiscent of Dewey. Let me cite one instance. A little pointer that shows when the bus is going to turn—used in Black Forest tourist busses—serves as a graphic representation of the function of the concept, emphasizing the pragmatic function of thought in opposition to older correspondence theories of knowledge.[31] The new doctrine, to be sure, will not admit to being a theory of knowledge—that is one of the old useless categories. Its sentences belong to a new propaedeutic to a new insight into the nature of being. No such stereotype as "theory of knowledge" is allowed. And yet, disguised under a new title, the doctrines of knowledge as predictive, of cognition as originating from practise and subordinate to its ends, are distinctly visible—rendering the system, again, plausible in contrast to the straw men of sterile correspondence epistemologies. Some quasi-scientific

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

anthropological doctrines likewise occur in the form of a contrast in the behavior of civilized and primitive men. One considers the picture of a savage and a modern European faced for the first time with the sight of a new machine,[32] and draws a conclusion about the difference between *"Benommenheit"* (takenness), and *"Verhalten"* (taking an attitude), "Insistence" and "Transcendence," mere environment and true "world." But such terms as "routine habits" and "intelligent habits" would seem, actually, to fit the case as well as the more cryptic pair *"Benommenheit"* and *"Verhalten"* with their ontological retinue.

These, then, are some of the elements in Heidegger's philosophy: the repudiation of traditional philosophy in any but a radically novel interpretation, the rejection of the scientific attitude, the immersion in phenomena, the consequent baptism of these phenomena with new, tongue-twisting titles, and the construction on their base of towers of mystifying dogmata; the founding of such systems, finally, upon plausible descriptions of psychological and epistemological phenomena and reasonable generalizations about experience.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Modern Mind. MICHAEL ROBERTS. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1937. 284 pp. $2.75.

Mr. Roberts is best known as a critic of poetry; and he calls his analysis of the development of philosophic thought since the thirteenth century "a study of some changes in the use of the English language." But though his history is largely second-hand, his philosophic horizon necessarily insular, and his conception of modern psychology, like that of most cultivated Englishmen, limited to Freudianism, he manages to set forth some extremely suggestive ideas. He finds that the characteristic of British thought since Roger Bacon and William of Ockham has been an awareness of language as an instrument formed for a particular purpose, and a profound distrust of linguistic habits as an immediate key to the structure of the world. The English, since they are not a "logical race," perhaps because their language is an amalgam of so many different elements, have generally recognized that they were merely talking about the world; whereas Continental philosophers have often imagined they were actually grasping its structure. A nominalism which realizes that all concepts and abstractions not directly observed are, as Ockham put it, "fictions" constructed with some

[32] Example used in discussion.

practical purpose in view, may hope to escape the pitfalls of any particular set of verbal habits; it can avoid mere grammatical disputation between the various languages that speak of the same world in terms of different interests, and it need not be limited to talk of what we can see and touch, or measure, as the only human discourse.

When the language which deals with some part of experience is neglected, we tend to underrate that experience and misunderstand older descriptions of it. A conflict developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries between religion and science, because both had come to speak in the prosaic and unmetaphorical tongue of commerce and material science. In the seventeenth century both theologians and scientists, forgetting the wisdom of nominalism, failed to criticize their own verbal habits. They neglected the Augustinian insight that science deals with the means of fulfilling our intentions, that it aims at no passive intellectual satisfaction, but is the instrument of the wisdom of an active will. In truth, poetry, which expresses in metaphor the immediate qualities of experience, is the natural language of religion. But the speech of scientific realism has made us feel, even when we recognize that religious doctrines are poetically true, that poetic truth is somehow less real than scientific; what can not be said in the language of mechanics is thought to be false, and religion and poetry are rejected by an irrelevant criterion. Worst of all, theologians have themselves forgotten the language of poetry: they have confused and falsified man's spiritual experience by trying to attach a religious significance to scientific notions which do not admit it, and have followed Eddington and Jeans in reducing the poetry of religion to "slushy prose."

Such a view enables Mr. Roberts to do full justice to the Augustinian nominalism of Ockham; it is rather hard on the realistic Aristotelianism of Thomas, whose devotion to intelligibility is made responsible for the conversion of instrumental abstractions into a fixed structure of nature. Such Aristotelianism led to dogmatism in thought and formalism in religion. For both it was unfortunate that Thomas was more conscious of the fallibility of the senses than of the delights of new discovery. Thomism is intellectual and Latin, Augustinism practical and English; science, which is pragmatic rather than intellectual, concerned with prediction and control, developed out of the latter. It is therefore somewhat surprising when Mr. Roberts finds the seventeenth-century scientists as realistic as their Thomistic opponents, committed to an equally real but opposing structure of nature—a misconception that made conflict irrepressible. Galileo invented his mechanics for the purposes of engineering; but he spoke of it in a plain unmetaphorical language which in the hands of Hobbes—who here appears as a realist, not

a nominalist—proceeded to transform the English tongue from the Elizabethan and Jacobean vehicle of poetry into an exact and logical instrument. Though clarity and precision were gained, sensuous immediacy was lost; and since language like any other instrument influences the user, the plain unpoetic speech that emerged made the expression of imaginative and religious experience impossible. Despite the efforts of Herbert, Donne, Vaughan, and Andrewes to create a deliberately unscientific language for poetry and religion, the "close, naked, natural way of speaking" of Hobbes won out, and was carried into religion itself by the Cambridge Platonists. The crucial charge against Hobbes is not that he was an atheist, but that he was blind to poetry. He did not deny its existence, he judged it trivial. Understanding only the scientific use of language, he interpreted theological doctrine as if it were scientific. Though they opposed Hobbes' doctrines, the Cambridge men succumbed in the end to his language; and the eighteenth-century theologians destroyed religion, not because they admired reason, but because they were addicted to the vocabulary of science alone.

Both the philosophic fertility and the historical limitations of Mr. Roberts' study are apparent. On the whole he is successful in bringing his linguistic analysis to bear upon modern physics and its theological parasites, upon biology and psychology. For their appropriate purposes, he maintains, both religion and science are equally "true." That the poetic language of religion is as necessary as the language of science he has convincingly shown. Unfortunately his further conclusions, that this establishes the existence of some power and purpose beyond men's conscious wills and different from the world of matter, that the science which furnishes the means of fulfilling our intentions can not justify those intentions themselves, and that there is need of an authoritative church, will not seem to follow for many of his most sympathetic readers. But this fact should not obscure the fruitfulness of his analysis of philosophy in terms of its language, and of language itself in close connection with the experiences it was designed to express.

J. H. R., Jr.

Die Werttheorien, Geschichte und Kritik. Oskar Kraus. (Veröffentlichungen der Brentanogesellschaft, II.) Brünn und Leipzig: Rudolf M. Rohrer. 1937. xviii + 515 pp.

This work, which is brought forward on the one hundredth anniversary of Brentano's birth (January 16, 1938), is the second publication of the Brentanogesellschaft. It is a remarkably rich his-

torical and critical survey of the field of value-theory by one who stands in close connection with the teachings of Brentano. Brentano's influence being what it was, such a survey can not fail to be illuminating with respect to many modern theories of value. In addition, however, it must be noted that Kraus's own views are not mere repetitions of Brentano's work, but proceed independently beyond what Brentano himself taught.

The book appears to me to be a work which is of real importance to students of value-theory, and yet it is almost impossbile to assess its precise worth. Its chief contribution to the literature of its subject lies in the manner in which Kraus, on the basis of amazingly wide knowledge and careful scholarship, brings together and compares English and German value-theory. Under the guidance of his criticism the movements in the two countries no longer appear as the isolated and disparate phenomena which we have so often taken them to be.

On the other hand, the book may be said to have many and obvious faults. One can never be sure precisely what sort of treatment will be accorded a particular thinker. We find, for example, that in this book of some five hundred pages twenty lines are devoted to Mill. Or again, in the treatment of Kant the pre-critical work, *Ueber die Deutlichkeit . . .*, receives more careful attention than does any other one of his works. Such apparent distortions demand an explanation if one is to take the work seriously. The explanation follows.

Kraus has written a book which is neither a reference book nor an introductory survey. It is a critical-historical work concerning value-theory as seen from one point of view; it is written in the belief that this point of view represents the fruition of a long series of theories in regard to value. Whether or not we agree with this developmental interpretation of the history of value-theory, we must grant that Kraus has not forced his material into a too rigid mold. And if we find fault with many of his individual discussions (e.g., those of Plato and of Scheler), there are so many others which are sharp and suggestive that the serious student of value-theory can not afford to neglect the book.

M. M.

Spengler und die Romantik. Eberhard Gauhe. (Neue Deutsche Forschungen, Band 152.) Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 1937. 122 pp. 5.20 M.

Dr. Gauhe's purpose is to show how certain outlooks in the field of historical and social criticism, which have come to be considered modern, are in effect revivals of a fundamentally Romantic attitude. He has chosen Spengler as an outstanding example.

The first section of the book is devoted to a very suggestive analysis of such conceptions as individuality, development, necessity, organology, and morphology in the Romantic appraisal of history and society. Drawing upon the works of Novalis, Schlegel, Schelling, and Ranke, the author traces the development and significance of these ideas with a lucidity and penetration which is certain to make his book valuable to students of the period.

In the second part, which treats of Spengler's use and elaboration of these Romantic conceptions, the exposition is equally brilliant, but the general impression is that Dr. Gauhe, in his disentanglement of the themes which run through Spengler's work, has perhaps made them clearer and more sharply defined than they are in Spengler's own mind. This is especially true of his discussion of Spengler's theory of cycles, and his use of the analogy between society and the organism-conceptions which are often badly confused in the *Decline of the West*. The question also arises as to how far any historian who makes such abundant and literal use of these rather dubious conceptions is, as Dr. Gauhe considers Spengler to be, a characteristic example of contemporary historiography.

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Through Science to Philosophy. HERBERT DINGLE. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. New York: Oxford University Press. 1937. vii + 363 pp. $5.00.

These Lowell Lectures for 1936 by the well-known English astrophysicist make provoking as well as interesting reading. Professor Dingle's aim is to make intelligible the achievements of recent physics by analyzing its method, rather than by drugging his readers' minds with pictorial but misleading accounts of the content of physical theory. His general thesis is that theoretical physics is a creature of reason, whose *raison d'être* is the correlation of experience to form a logical system; theoretical physics must not be taken as formulating "the truth" about an "objective world" of individuals existing antecedently to the operations of reason. The fundamental assumption from which this conclusion is developed is that science is a process going on in our "consciousness" and that it refers to nothing "outside" the latter. Accordingly, it is maintained that within the field of consciousness an originally undifferentiated and unrelated "experience" serves as the raw material for "reason": reason breaks up experience into various "atoms," and then correlates them to obtain a coherent logical scheme. For this purpose various "scientific objects" or "postulates" are invented, such as electrons, light-rays, and mass-points. Experience can ex-

ercise no restraint upon the character of these inventions, and it is a fundamental error in analysis, according to the author, to assign to these postulates the status which experiences have in the field of consciousness.

In terms of this apparatus of distinctions, Professor Dingle then examines many of the alleged "paradoxes" of recent physics, and attempts to show that there are in fact no paradoxes but that theoretical physics is thoroughly intelligible. He discusses relativity and quantum theory, subjective and physical time, causality and determinism, and on all these topics has clarifying things to say. Of particular interest are his chapters on time, in which he analyses the relation of thermodynamic laws to the choice of clocks to "measure" time. He claims that time can not in fact be measured, largely because time-intervals can not in general be directly compared, since unit-intervals can not be transported in time; but his reasons do not seem to the present reviewer serious ones. However, he makes the interesting suggestion that the "irreversibility" of the laws of heat is a consequence of our using a mechanical clock instead of a thermal one: by choosing a thermal clock, thermodynamics can be made to have only reversible laws while mechanics will have irreversible ones. He concludes, therefore, that the catastrophic consequences which have been deduced from the law of entropy will not bear close analysis.

Needless to say, the solipsistic foundations of Professor Dingle's views are highly dubious, and it is not easy to ascertain just what he understands the import of his solipsism to be. What is meant, for example, by saying that there is nothing "outside" of consciousness? And why is it, if "experience" is just a group of unrelated "atoms" and can not restrict the operations of "reason," that "no intelligent action is possible until rational correlation of some kind and in some degree has been made"? On the other hand, it is possible that his professed solipsism is only a mode of speech, so that everything he says may be translatable into a less misleading account of theoretical science. Professor Dingle must certainly be credited with showing how irrelevant to physics are the theologies and metaphysical systems which have recently been read into it; and his book also shows that clarity can be introduced into discussions of scientific terms and statements, by exhibiting the function they possess in the context of scientific inquiry. But one wishes that he had not placed his discussions of theoretical physics into a matrix of ideas which few will find persuasive and even fewer readily intelligible.

E. N.

Das Problem der reinen Anschauung. Untersuchung der Prinzipien der Mathematik. WOLFGANG CRAMER. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1937. vi + 89 pp. 5.80 M.

This essay represents an excellent and elaborate study of the nature of mathematics, based on an exhaustive knowledge of modern theories of mathematics and theories of knowledge.

The more or less arbitrary nature of the axioms, as well as the fact that all mathematical objects are derived from them, are products of our mind, eliminates the possibility of an ideal existence of mathematical elements, which some modern philosophers assume. It would be worth while, however, to investigate further what these philosophers really mean when speaking of the ideal nature of mathematical objects.

The fact that only in mathematics symbols are at the same time the object of the science, prohibits also any identification of mathematics with logic or philosophy in general. The symbols of logic are not identical with their objects, which are real objects and the logical judgment is basically different from the mathematical relation. Furthermore, in mathematics, axioms are undemonstrable and never questioned, whereas logic tries to deduce them from general principles, and thus makes them its objects.

The origin of mathematics in the mind, however, does not mean that mathematical objects are produced by pure thought as Neo-Kantianism assumes. Cramer maintains that the objects of mathematics are given by *reine Anschauung* and proves this statement by a very interesting generalization of the Kantian term (which holds valid only for Euclidean geometry) from the acts of pure *Sinnlichkeit* to acts in general. *Reine Anschauung* means the general form in which objects by the very nature of our acts are given. Mathematics is the science of the general *a priori* order of the process of thought, in which the process itself becomes the object. While this conception of mathematics solves the problem of application of mathematics to reality and explains also the possibility of the creation of different systems of mathematics, there still remains the philosophical problem of the adequacy of different axioms to reality!

We would appreciate also a more detailed analysis of the relation between formal logic and mathematics, but we nevertheless can highly recommend this book to all those who are interested in the modern discussion of the fundamentals of mathematics.

GERHART SAENGER.

NEW YORK CITY.

Die Erkenntnisbeziehung. KARL BOLDT. (Beitrage zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, 5.) Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1937. 47 pp. 1.80 M.

Boldt attempts to solve the problem of knowledge by starting from the subject-object relation and investigating the general structure of the system of sciences in itself. The attempt proves to be an extremely superficial and even false survey of the general structure of this system and ends in the assertion of some rather confused principles, which are said to solve the problem of epistemology.

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NEW YORK CITY.

OTHER NEW BOOKS AND JOURNALS

Roth, Eugen: Axiomatische Untersuchungen zur projektiven, affinen und metrischen Geometrie. (Forschungen zur Logik und zur Grundlegung der exakten Wissenschaften, Neue Folge, Heft 2.) Leipzig: S. Hirzel. 1937. 58 pp. 2.60 M.

Matisse, Georges: Identité du monde et de la connaissance. (La philosophie de la nature.) Paris: Félix Alcan. 256 pp. 35 fr.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. 37e Année, No. 6. M. Georges Dwelshauvers: *M. Fillère.* Les grandes lignes de la pensée indienne: *J. Auboyer.* Note sur la prévision scientifique: *Y. Simon.*

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ÄSTHETIK UND ALLGEMEINE KUNSTWISSENSCHAFT. Band XXXII, Heft 1. Das Überwirkliche in der Kunst: *Richard Müller-Freienfels.* Die romantische Kunstanschauung Wackenroders und Tiecks: *Margarete Wiedemann.* Der dramatische Aufbau von Shakespeares "Hamlet": *G. A. Künstler.*

PHILOSOPHIA. Vl. 2, Fasc. 1–4. La connaisance humaine et le transcendent: *Jean Petrovici.* Jean Petrovici, zu seinem Jubiläum als Universitätslehrer: *Tudor Vianu.* Isaac Newton and Jacob Boehme: *Stephen Hobhouse.* Der "Homo Iuridicus" und die Unzulänglichkeit des Rechts als Lebensregel: *Giorgio Del Vecchio.* Hat die Philosophie ausgespielt? *Arthur Liebert.* Die Aufgabe der philosophischen Anthropologie: *Helmuth Plessner.* Thomas Mann als Dialektiker: *Siegfried Marck.* Ueber Gestaltqualitäten: *Christian von Ehrenfels.* Tragische Existenz: *Hans-Joachim Schoeps.* Three Conceptions of Culture: *E. S. Brightman.* Twilight of the Absolutes: *Paul E. Johnson.* Platonism—Philosophy of the Tragic Muse: *Gustav E. Mueller.* Articles on Humanism by *Arthur Liebert, Rudolf Kayser, Fritz Kühner, Domenico A. Cardone, Pasquale Romanelli.*

LA CRITICA. Anno XXXVI, fasc 1. Studi su poesie antiche e moderne (cont.) VIII, Intorno al Baudelaire: *Benedetto Croce.*

Studi sulla storiografia. I, Storici e politici; II, La storiografia di partito e la storiografia di sopra ai partiti; III, Il carattere preparante e indeterminante della storiografia rispetto all'azione: *Benedetto Croce.* Storici europei del secolo XIX (cont.). III, Guilio Michelet: *Guido de Ruggiero.* Come nacque e come morì il marxismo teorico in Italia (1895–1900). Da lettere e ricordi personali: *Benedetto Croce.*

GIORNALE CRITICO DELLA FILOSOFIA ITALIANA. Anno XVIII, Fasc. V. L'oggetto della storia: *G. Gentile.* Il problema del nulla nella filosofia di M. Heidegger: *E. Grassi.* Il pensiero politico di David Hume: *G. Candeloro.*

NOTES AND NEWS

The Fourth International Congress for the Unity of Science will be held at Girton College, Cambridge, England, July 14–19, 1938. The theme will be "Scientific Language." The preliminary program is as follows:

July 14: General Addresses.
July 15: Special Problems of Scientific Language.
July 16: Linguistics, Behavioristics.
July 17: Formalization of Special Sciences.
July 18: Parallel Sessions with Various Themes.
July 19: Summaries.

Contributions: Donors, upwards of $25.00; Active members, $5.00; Students and relations of members, $1.25. Contributions payable to the order of "International Congresses for the Unity of Science" to the N. V. Rotterdamsche Bankvereenniging, The Hague.

One hundred members can be accommodated in Girton College. The charges are $2.70 per day inclusive.

Please make your decision to participate known to: International Institute for the Unity of Science, 267 Obrechtstraat, The Hague, Holland.